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The Politics of Population Movements in Contemporary Iraq: 
A Research Agenda
Géraldine Chatelard1
Chapter in R. Bocco, J. Tejet and P. Sluglett (eds.) (forthcoming) Writing the History of Iraq: 
Historiographical and Political Challenges, London: World Scientific Publishers/Imperial College 
Press. 
Abstract
This essay, in the form of a research agenda, focuses on the politics of population movements from 
the inception of the modern Iraqi state to the present. Based mainly on secondary sources, it asks 
questions, offers hypotheses and opens up a number of conceptual pathways in part drawing from 
Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality. It is proposed to consider how population movements 
were affected by the state and other political actors, particularly in the process of nation building 
and in recent struggles over the control of the state. Within this framework, displacement and 
policies restricting the mobility of people or forcing their emplacement in certain locations could be 
read as forms of control political actors have exerted over populations. Other instances of 
population movements can be interpreted as the uncontrolled results of policies of political or 
economic engineering, crises of the political system or political decisions leading to armed 
conflicts. It is suggested that, beyond the numerous and brutal ruptures in Iraqi political history, a 
study of the politics of population movements throughout the modern history of Iraq identifies some 
of the continuities that have existed in the exercise of power under successive regimes but also the 
sociological continuum that exists between states and would-be-states. A further argument is that 
examining the multiple effects of governmentality on human mobility and immobility in Iraq allows 
a possible reading of the way in which certain practices of power and certain political identities 
have been historically encoded leading to patterns of reproduction of violence. 
1Associate Researcher at the Institut français du Proche-Orient (Ifpo), Amman. The author would 
like to thank Hamit Bozarslan, Peter Harling, Riccardo Bocco and Peter Sluglett for their 
suggestions about previous versions of this chapter. 
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A significant blind spot in the historiography of contemporary Iraq is the question of the recurrence 
and durability of population displacement and forced migration.2 Whereas a large body of research 
has been devoted to Palestinian displacement, to the point of constituting an area of scholarship per  
se within the broader field of Palestinian studies, displacement and other forms of involuntary 
migration in and from Iraq have largely escaped academic interest as topics in their own right. 
Recent trends of involuntary migration taking place in the wake of the change of regime in 2003 – 
particularly the sectarian-based displacement which erupted on a large scale after the al-‘Askari 
shrine bombing in Samarra’ in 2006 – have spurred a new policy interest for those Iraqis defined by 
international law and humanitarian organisations as refugees when they have crossed international 
boundaries and as internally displaced persons (IDPs) when they have fled from their homes but 
remained inside their country. As seems to be invariably the case with ‘hot’ issues on international 
humanitarian and policy agendas, a growing number of researchers – particularly doctoral students 
affiliated with Western European and North American universities – are focusing on the post-2003 
displacement.3 Several publications are already available attempting to provide documentary or 
analytical views of the most recent trends of internal displacement and refugee migration since the 
regime of Saddam Hussein was brought to an end.4 These works, published or in progress, are 
dominated by the approach of refugee studies and concerned mostly with the anthropological, 
sociological, humanitarian or policy dimensions of involuntary migration from Iraq to foreign 
countries. First-hand empirically based academic research on the dynamics, politics and 
socioeconomic effects of involuntary migration inside Iraq is conspicuously lacking, possibly 
because of a tense security situation which is not conducive to research. On the other hand there 
might also be a more structural reason for this near absence of research on involuntary migration 
inside Iraq:  the tendency of refugee studies to focus on the same issues, populations and 
geographical areas as those of concern to institutional actors within the international refugee regime 
whose mandate has traditionally emphasised the protection of refugees in host countries. 
The focus on current trends, and on refugee experiences and institutional policies outside Iraq has at 
least two important disadvantages.  On the one hand, it leads to disregarding historical continuities 
in the phenomenon of involuntary migration in/from Iraq. On the other hand, causality for internal 
displacement and refugee movements is widely attributed to generalized violence and inter-
sectarian conflict ensuing from the security void created by a weak state after regime change in 
2003. In this vision, which appears to be the one most generally shared by humanitarian actors and 
Western governments with a stake in Iraq, a restoration of state authority – expected to guarantee 
2 There is considerable debate in the overlapping fields of forced migration and refugee studies with 
regard to terminology and typologies. Here, I use displacement when migration takes place under 
direct compulsion, whereas I reserve forced migration for cases where compulsion exists but is 
indirect and the scope for deciding to migrate is wider. I use involuntary migration, or involuntary 
population movements, to encompass both instances. I do not deny that subjects have the capacity 
to exert their agency and make migration decisions even under severe compulsion, but it is not my 
aim in this essay to discuss the perspective and experience of the migrants themselves. 
3Personal observations and communications with over forty, mostly US and Western European, 
researchers since 2007.  
4Since 2007, advocacy and humanitarian organisations have produced dozens of reports on Iraqi 
refugees abroad and IDPs inside Iraq. Media coverage, especially in the US and UK press, has been 
important as of 2008. A number of documentary films and book essays, mostly by journalists, have 
also been devoted to Iraqi refugees. A new but growing trend is that of memoirs written by Iraqis 
who recount their experiences of exile. Published academic or para-academic production is yet 
limited albeit, here too, growing (see, in particular, Marfleet 2007; Shoeb et al 2007; International 
Crisis Group 2008; Leenders 2008; Sassoon 2008; Doraï 2009; Chatelard 2010). 
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overall security and re-start economic development5– is seen as the solution which will  curb new 
involuntary migration and lay the ground for the return of the refugees and those internally 
displaced. For those acquainted with the modern history of Iraq, maybe the most problematic aspect 
of this faith in the role of the state to solve the current ‘Iraq displacement crisis’ and prevent new 
involuntary population movements is that is it precisely the Iraqi state, in its various guises between 
1920 and 2003, that has been the main entity responsible for involuntary migration inside and 
outside the country. Furthermore the Iraqi state, especially under Saddam Hussein, also displayed 
remarkable tenacity at retaining many Iraqis inside the country against their will,6 and at confining 
certain populations to specific areas of Iraq. Without seeming excessively pessimistic about the type 
of regime that will emerge from a consolidation of the new Iraqi state, it is worthwhile reflecting 
upon the fact that government stability and economic prosperity in Iraq – both of which existed to 
some extent, however briefly, under the rule of the Ba‘th – have not previously been synonymous 
with the principle of freedom of movement. Although I will not address the issue here, I would 
argue that it is useful to consider recent trends of displacement and forced migration in the light of 
previous episodes and ask in precisely which ways the post-Saddam Hussein trends differ from 
previous ones while still displaying several similar characteristics. 
No general historical work on modern Iraq fails to mention the episodes of mass displacement or 
forced migration to which Assyrians, Kurds of all persuasions, Turkmen, Jews, individuals deemed 
of Iranian descent, and Shi‘i Arabs from the South have been subjected. In the same books, readers 
will find accounts of the emigration (by eviction or voluntary exile) of political opponents or 
irredentist populations, such as the Kurds and Yazidis, a trend that dates back to the British mandate 
era (1920–32). Most of the instances of displacement, forced and political migration listed above 
have also been documented, often in great detail and using original sources, in scholarly 
monographs devoted to particular ethnicities, displacement episodes, political parties or historical 
periods. Iraqi historians writing from the perspective of Arab nationalism or official Ba‘thist history 
are no more prone than their colleagues with different outlooks to gloss over involuntary migration 
and political emigration.  They simply place them in a different interpretive framework and couch 
them in other terms. 
In addition to scholarly works, involuntary migration features largely in the apologetic writings 
dealing with, and often produced by politicized intellectuals among, Iraqi Shi‘is, Kurds, Turkmen 
and Assyrians, and in the advocacy literature of human rights and refugee organisations. It would be 
surprising if published or unpublished memoirs, essays and pamphlets by members of opposition 
parties in Iraq overlooked these issue. Here too the selection of facts, interpretation and terminology 
are likely to differ from the ones adopted by historians trained in Western academia. Most certainly, 
such accounts must stand in sharp ideological contrast to those written by pan-Arab or Ba‘thist 
historians. 
5Economic factors have been identified by Philip Marfleet (2007) as one major cause of departure 
from Iraq in the post-2003 period. 
6Alan Dowty, who surveyed emigration policies worldwide in the 1980s, placed Iraq on a list of 21 
states imposing severe restrictions on the ability of their citizens to leave the country of their own 
free will. The most obvious common denominator among these states was not the level of economic 
development, nor the threat of brain drain, but the nature of the regime: all were heavily ideologized 
one-party states. Iraq stood out, together with Burma and Somalia, as an exception in that, contrary 
to the 18 other states, it was not a self-defined Marxist-Leninist regime. Dowty notes that: 
“Although large numbers [of people] may occasionally leave such states, legal exit is basically 
viewed as a privilege to be granted by the government rather than a right to be exercised” (1988: 
90). 
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What seems to be lacking, therefore, is not historical and empirical material – necessarily varied in 
nature and perspective – but rather any conceptual attempt to link various types and episodes of 
involuntary migration together to try to make sense of the recurrence of the phenomenon and of a 
certain regularity in patterns. This is what I propose to attempt in this essay by broadening the 
perspective to discuss the politics of population movements from the inception of the modern Iraqi 
state to the present. In addition to what is classically subsumed under the phrase involuntary 
migration, this problematization will lead me to consider other types of population movements 
affected by the state and other political actors.  
Nation building and state control over population movements
State and conflict-induced population displacements and migration have a long history in the 
Middle East, going back to the Ottoman empire and beyond to the Byzantine era. Such population 
movements also have a broad regional scope and their effects are felt in most of the modern states 
previously under Ottoman rule (Shami 1996). In the introduction to her recent historical and 
ethnographic study, Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East, Dawn Chatty 
notes that “The Middle East in particular has been the scene of continuous forced migration over the 
past 150 years” and that dispossession of people in the region should be located “as part of the 
policy of empire, carried further by the colonial encounter and then revitalized in the Arab socialist 
awakening of the mid-twentieth century” (2010: 1–2). 
There are several possible frameworks through which to interpret the complexity and durability of 
involuntary population movements in Iraq. However the overarching one is likely to remain the 
process of nation building. Modern Iraq indeed appears as a classical case of twentieth century post-
imperial nation-state formation of the type that the prominent refugee studies scholar Aristide 
Zolberg analysed in his seminal 1983 article on “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-
Generating Process.” Population displacements in Iraq were intrinsically linked to the creation of a 
nation state seeking to homogenize populations, assert sovereignty over territories contested by 
other nationalist claims, silence domestic political opposition, and perform population engineering 
as part of policies of modernisation and development. Successive Iraqi regimes have exerted control 
over population movements both by limiting the mobility of certain categories of the population 
inside the national territory and across borders, and by forcibly displacing other categories 
internally or outside the national space under a variety of policies and legitimization regimes. While 
displacement took place under direct compulsion exerted by state authorities or because of conflict, 
forced migration for its part was usually the uncontrolled results of policies of political engineering 
or modernisation, particularly the mass migration from rural to urban areas. Other trends of 
emigration under various levels of constraint were the consequences of crises of the political system 
or political decisions taken by governments. This was the case with the departure of families who 
were members of the elite under the monarchy after the 1958 revolution. It was also the case with 
the economic migration of the middle class under the international embargo imposed on Iraq in 
1991 as a result of the invasion of Kuwait, and, arguably, with the exodus of the Christians over the 
same period. Each of these emigrant groups were driven by a set of dynamics that cannot be 
reduced to their relations with the state, but in each instance, state policies were a determining 
factor that indirectly impacted their decision to leave Iraq.   
Recasting displacement as a form of state control over populations entails considering the 
phenomenon in correlation with policies restricting the mobility of people or forcing their 
emplacement and confinement in certain locations.  Through systems of identification that formed 
the basis for exclusion and inclusion practices successive political powers have defined the 
boundaries of the nation and created different categories of subjects. These categories ranged from 
those fully admitted into the national body to those alien to it and susceptible to be physically 
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expelled from the country.  Several groups fell into intermediate categories: they were the primary 
targets of population engineering by the state, particularly mass relocation from one area to another 
inside the country or forced confinement. Some also ran the risk of being downgraded to non 
nationals.7  Furthermore, other types of manifestations of authoritarian governance have to be 
considered as regards the effects of state policies over human mobility, particular forms of 
exclusion from the allocation of economic resources under developmental regimes. 
At another level, and more obliquely, practices of control over population movements represent an 
angle from which to understand the durability of violence as a means of exercising and accessing 
power. Examining the multiple effects of governmentality on human mobility and immobility 
allows a possible and more inclusive reading of the way in which certain practices of power and 
certain political identities have been historically encoded leading to patterns of reproduction of 
violence.8 Looking at the nexus between state policies and population movements/mobility has the 
potential to illuminate a series of extremely important historical phenomena in contemporary Iraq. 
On the one hand, it may help understand how, in the construction process of a post-imperial, post-
colonial, self-declared progressive and developmentalist nation-state – where the public discourse 
of nationalism and modernisation has generally dominated – a set of social, religious and cultural 
identities have continued to be primordialized and have acquired (or have not lost) political and 
conflictual dimensions. Furthermore, looking at the movements of population throughout the 
modern history of Iraq identifies some of the continuities that have existed in the exercise of power 
under successive regimes – monarchical, republican, military –, all autocratic or authoritarian in 
varying degrees. Finally, an examination of control over population movements across time might 
reveal the sociological continuum that exists between states and would-be-states, that is the actors 
who project themselves from exile or from inside Iraq as potential states. Population movements 
should therefore be read as a factor structuring political identities and the reproduction of political 
violence. 
One important premise guides my argument: the rejection of essentializing analyses of violence and 
political instability in Iraq as being intrinsically embedded in the fragmentary nature of the society 
based on supposedly incompatible religious, ethnic or tribal identities. These approaches are 
problematic from an epistemological as well as a moral point of view. Morally, they justify 
authoritarianism and state coercion9 as necessary modes of governance to ‘hold together’ groups 
between which no social contract is alleged to be possible. Alternatively, they have come to inspire 
7By degrees, such sanctification of national identity and exclusionary policies laid the ground for 
justifying, during the last phases of the Anfal campaign, the mass physical elimination of those rural 
Kurds who resisted relocation from their villages in areas where Kurdish guerilla were active (the 
so-called “prohibited areas”), and who did not register in the 1987 national census as residents of 
designated towns or residential complexes under government control. These Kurds lost their Iraqi 
citizenship and were presented by the official rhetoric not only as traitors and saboteurs, but also as 
having excluded themselves voluntary from the national ranks. Families of “unrepentant saboteurs” 
were physically removed from government-controlled areas and forced to join their kin in the 
prohibited areas. This mass deprivation of citizenship seems to have been a necessary step in 
convincing local commanders loyal to the central Iraqi regime to enforce a directive ordering armed 
forces to kill all living beings, human or animal, within the prohibited areas (see Human Rights 
Watch 1993: Chapter 2). 
8I draw theoretically on the concept of governmentality developed by the philosopher Michel 
Foucault and on the work of political scientist John Torpey on the monopoly claimed by modern 
states on the legitimate means of circulation (Torpey 1988; Caplan and Torpey 2001). 
9I take coercion as a category of political violence exerted on populations by states or other political 
organisations (parties, militias, etc.).
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the political project of territorial-based ethnic and confessional federalism promoted and 
implemented in post-Ba‘thist Iraq at various times both by the US Administration and by a number 
of local political actors. Epistemologically, I share the hypothesis put forth by several scholars of 
Iraq that political identities based on ‘primordial’ affiliations are largely historical constructs.10 They 
have developed in a dialectical relation between state powers (colonial rulers, Iraqi national 
governments, or governments of neighbouring countries) and local leaderships: the latter have been 
cast by state rhetoric and actions as ethnic or religious leaders; at other times, ethnic or religious 
identity politics has proven more efficient to access resources and power. Note should also be taken 
of the works of scholars who have shown that this dynamic has coexisted with the development of 
other non-sectarian and non-ethnic political ideologies, from pan-Arabist and communist to Iraqi 
nationalism.11 Others have underlined one particularly striking feature of modern Iraq: the 
coexistence, within the authoritarian state, of modernisation policies expressed through 
development projects and the allocation of resources.12 What follows should be taken as  a thesis in 
progress and a research agenda that offers hypotheses and tries to open up a number of conceptual 
pathways in the hope that some will be tested and others contested by scholars of contemporary 
Iraq. 
Control over mobility and political coercion 
Although the volume of the various displacement episodes taking place in Iraq since the 1920s has 
been variable, one constant has been their collective nature: the displaced have been members of 
social groups identified by various political regimes as sharing an identity both cohesive and 
primordialized (ethnic, confessional, ethno-confessional or ethno-national, but also based on 
kinship ties within a patriarchal system) deemed incompatible with and/or a threat to some notion of 
an Iraqi national order. Several episodes have been massive, with people displaced by the tens and 
even hundreds of thousands. Others affected only members of the religious or political elites of 
specific groups. Displacement was induced directly by state policies of deportation usually 
following denial of citizenship or denationalization. This was the case as early as 1923, with a 
handful of prominent Shi‘i clerics who were also political leaders opposed to the British mandate 
whose Iraqi nationality was contested or in some cases taken away by the government before they 
were deported to Iran (Nakash 1994; Luizard 1996). In the early years of the Ba‘thist takeover, this 
line of thinking re-emerged with great vigour: the same accusations of collusion with Iran and 
betrayal of Iraqi national interests were made against Shi‘is deemed of Iranian descent who were 
deported in very large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s (Nakash 1994; Babakhan 1994a). Through a 
series of discriminatory measures, executions, and accusations of Zionism, almost all the Jewish 
population of Iraq was convinced to relinquish their Iraqi citizenship and emigrate between 1950 
and the early 1970s (Shiblak 1986). In all instances, it was in the name of the defence of Arab 
nationalism that vast groups of the population were denied national status and consequently 
expelled from the Iraqi national body. 
Armed conflicts, domestic or international, have also provided direct or indirect inducements for 
forced population movements, especially those that erupted in connection with the Kurdish and 
Assyrian nationalist claims as early as the 1930s. Kurdish displacement continued for decades, 
peaking in the 1980s during the eight-year war with Iran. Revolts against the Ba‘thist regime, 
particularly the 1991 uprising in the South and North of the country, were other occasions for large 
scale displacement inside Iraq or to neighbouring countries (Yacoub 1986; Babakhan 1994a; 
Babakhan 1994b; Fuccaro 1997; Alborzi 2006). Whereas some populations were forced out of 
10In particular, see Peter Harling’s contribution to this volume.
11Especially Hanna Batatu (1978), Sami Zubaida (2003), and Eric Davis (2005). 
12 Such as, but not limited to, Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (1983), and Habib Ishow 
(1996).
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specific spaces (rural, regional or national), the Ba‘thist regime in parallel pursued policies of 
population redistribution and demographic engineering combining the relocation of some ethnic 
groups (particularly the Kurds and the Turkmen) and importing Arabs, the policy of the so-called 
Arabisation of the oil-producing regions of Kirkuk and Mosul (Hilterman 2007). Most of these 
displacements were linked to one another:  the settlement of Arabs lead to displacement of Kurds 
and Turkmen through different administrative techniques entitling the former to food distribution, 
land and house ownership while depriving the others of those same entitlements (Romano 2005).  
In contrast with liberal states, successive Iraqi regime have not enshrined in law the principle of the 
free circulation of their nationals. The granting of travel documents has been restricted from the 
time of the British mandate until the post-Ba‘thist era under various types of legitimation and using 
various administrative practices. Under the Ba‘th, passports were delivered on the basis of 
individual and family loyalty or at least individual compliance with the regime, while the post-2003 
government introduced new control mechanisms on issuing passports shortly after it came to 
power.13 In both cases, national security has been used as the principal justification for checking the 
political loyalties of those allowed mobility across borders. More recently, a new mechanism has 
been put in place to control the exit of nationals by proxy. At the request of the Iraqi government, 
Syria and Jordan, whose regulations had previously permitted the free entry of Iraqis, introduced 
visas in 2007. Those wanting to leave Iraq now have to undergo a double process of screening by 
the Iraqi authorities and those of Syria or Jordan (Chatelard and Doraï, forthcoming). This is not to 
say that Iraqis have not been able to by-pass the various control mechanisms imposed on their 
movements, in particular by resorting to irregular practices (bribes, forged documents, etc.) or by 
activating patronage ties. However this has financial and social costs which in themselves act as 
selection mechanisms on would-be migrants including those fleeing violence (Chatelard 2010). 
Other types of mass population movements have been approached from the perspective of control 
over land ownership and production and the enhanced socio-economic role of the landlords. 
Alternatively, they have been analyzed from the perspective of social, economic and political 
history. They can also be read more systematically as displacement phenomena resulting, often 
unintentionally, from the application of authoritarian policies in the rural areas. In successive 
historical periods, land or agricultural policies in rural Iraq have been motivated by a national 
political agenda. This was the case when the monarchy sought to reinforce the economic base and 
the allegiance to the regime of a Kurdish and Arab landowning elite (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 
1983). After the 1958 military coup, the state’s new agrarian policies were aimed at undermining 
the power of this elite and ensuring state control over land (Ishow 1996). Although policies shifted 
radically between the monarchy and the various post-1958 regimes, the various land-tenure or 
agrarian reforms correlated directly with the massive migration (within the range of several 
millions) of peasants to urban centres, particularly Baghdad and Basra, between the late 1920s and 
the 1970s. This large scale internal migration had long-term repercussions on the economic and 
socio-political fabric of the country. The concept of “development-induced displacement” could be 
adequate if it did not generally fail to qualify the context within which development decisions are 
taken, which generally served to conceal the inequalities of power and coercion mechanisms in 
society. 
Highly authoritarian measures to maintain the rural labour-force in the countryside had largely 
proved counter-productive. Under the monarchy, to contain the massive potential migration of 
impoverished peasants to the cities, a legislation was passed in 1933 (the Law Governing the Rights 
and Duties of Cultivators) about which Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett wrote:  “One of 
13 Author's interviews with Iraqi migrants and refugees having left Iraq during the embargo and after 
the 2003 change of regime. 
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the most important features of the law was that fallahin indebted to the landowner were not 
permitted to leave his employment until the debts were paid off. As the vast majority were 
permanently indebted, the only way to break the circle was to run away from the land” (Farouk-
Sluglett and Sluglett 1983: 500). After 1958, the republican and military regimes applied policies of 
nationalisation of arable lands within a socialist ideological frame prioritising state planning and the 
collectivisation of the means of production, and later, at the time of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
privatisation of these state-owned lands to wealthy individuals (Ishow 1996: 195). All these 
measures failed to increase agricultural production substantially or to keep peasants in the 
countryside. The latter move, in correlation with the drafting of Iraqi men to be sent to the Iranian 
front, created the conditions for another massive population movement, the migration to Iraq of 
almost half a million Egyptian agricultural labourers (Ishow 1996: 194)
Habib Ishow identifies the principle of state property over lands as bearing heavily upon the rural 
communities by legitimizing de jure and de facto abuse of authority on the part of central 
governments (Ishow 1996: 192).  In addition to the poor performances of the agricultural sector and 
food insecurity, it resulted in destructuring rural communities and the tribal system. In the cities it 
brought about new class distinctions and new dynamics of economic, social and spatial 
marginalisation and eventually mobilisation and violent claims against the regime. The term shruqi 
became a stigmatizing social category originally used by Baghdadi urbanites to qualify the new 
migrants of rural background settled in slums on the periphery of the city, especially the area that 
became integrated into the urban fabric as a poor city neighbourhood, called Madinat al-Thawra in 
1958 and as Madinat as-Sadr after the fall of the Ba‘th. At this juncture, the term came to be used in 
a derogatory manner by those castigating poor militant Shi‘is. The further swelling of impoverished 
marginal neighbourhoods in the cities of the south and centre in the 1990s resulted also in part from 
state policies depriving non-compliant social groups of access to vital resources. The draining of the 
marshes in the early 1990s led to the destruction of the habitat and livelihoods of a marginal rural 
Shi‘i population that was evading the control of the regime. The number of shruqi-s kept growing in 
the cities and at least in the imagination of those who have been casting them as barbarian Others, 
now form the majority of the recruits of the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, one of the would-be-state 
organisations that carried out new forms of violence and sectarian cleansing in several major urban 
centres between 2006 and 2008. 
In combination with control over the international movement of nationals, various legal or 
administrative measures have aimed at confining populations to specific spaces inside Iraq. This 
was the case with the settlement policies of tribespeople on agricultural estates owned by landlords 
and control of the cross-border movement of bedouin tribes aiming at settling populations, 
containing them within national boundaries and making them obedient and productive subjects 
(Toth 2006: 70). Already under the monarchy civil status registration in one’s place of residence 
was used as a means of population control and to coerce peasants to remain as debt-bonded 
labourers on the estates of landowners (Ishow 1996: 118). Here again, fugitives to the cities tried to 
escape coercion by avoiding registration. The system remained in place throughout subsequent 
decades until the food distribution system which was introduced during the Iran–Iraq war, and 
which was maintained in place during the economic embargo starting in 1991, became a more 
effective tool of population surveillance and control since ration cards had to be renewed annually 
and change of residence without re-registration would entail the loss of entitlements (Von Sponeck 
2006: 35). The vast number of fugitives and displaced during the last period of Ba‘thist rule were 
de facto deprived of access to important food resources. In other instance, the confiscation of ration 
cards was used by the government’s coercive apparatus to force people to move. The ration card 
system, which has remained in place under the post-Ba‘thist regime, continues to be used by 
various authorities as a means to induce people either to move or to remain where they are. More 
8
than in the past, the cards have become a tool of population engineering, ensuring the ethnic, 
sectarian or tribal homogeneity of entire areas, and the forming of electoral constituencies now that 
the same system serves as the basis for voter registrations. The situation of those displaced in the 
previous period or under the new regime, the so-called IDPs, is critical in this regard (Romano 
2005: 438). Today, a number of other administrative measures imposed by the central government 
as well as by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) impede mobility between areas inside the 
country: in addition to rations cards that cannot be easily transferred between administrative areas, 
non-Kurdish Iraqis residing in the centre or south of the country who want to enter the Kurdish 
autonomous region are compelled to find a legal guarantor who is a civil servant in the 
administration of the KRG. 
The modalities of repression via state or other control over the mobility of political opponents have 
been different and devised in relation to the way regimes have qualified the nature of oppositions, 
rather than in relation to the way these oppositions have expressed and identified themselves. On 
the one hand, the various regimes have constantly tried to “purify” Iraq from those recalcitrant 
social elements whose ethnic or confessional identities could be amalgamated with non-Iraqi or 
non-Arab identities (such as Assyrian, Jews, Iranian, Kurds or Turkmen). However, even between 
categories of non-Arabs, the political grammar of Arabism in Iraq has operated a distinction 
between the Jew/Zionist, and Kurdish or Persian/Iranian. Since the creation of the state of Israel, the 
former has implied an absolute disqualification and separation from Arabism, whereas the latter two 
have allow certain patterns of inclusion or a least relations. On the other hand, regimes have tried to 
discipline and punish within the national space oppositions expressed in the idioms of nationalist or 
internationalist political ideologies (Communism, pan-Arabism, Syrian Ba‘thist in particular) not 
totally incompatible with the versions of Arabism sponsored by Iraqi governments. 
Political repression was translated into various modes of control over mobility, from expulsion and 
deportation to confinement – including house arrest and incarceration. In all cases, however, this 
control represented one particular form of coercion accompanied by other forms of violence, 
including the physical elimination of individuals as members of social groups redefined as political 
groups. All possible manner of violence was applied, ranging from torture and individual 
executions, to collective assassinations and mass killings. In several instances, mass crimes, in 
particular against the Kurds (Babakhan 1994b; Hilterman 2007), also caused large-scale 
displacement inside or outside the country. In other instances, the deliberate deprivation of access to 
resources vital for the security of individuals (land, water, food, shelter, access to employment in 
the public sector, citizenship) compelled large numbers of the categories targeted to migrate to other 
areas where alternative resources or security were available. Finally, individuals have sought to 
protect themselves from coercion by withdrawing within infra-state social units (whether religious 
community, tribe, family, domestic space), not necessarily implying physical but social, symbolic 
and psychological displacement (Bozarslan 2003: 32).  
Under all the different political regimes in Iraq, and in various ways, the state has placed entire 
categories of the population in situations of great insecurity through actions in different spheres 
(legal, administrative, economic, political, security, military etc.) but whose commonality is that 
they were expressions of a sovereignty that did not seek legitimation through the rule of law, 
universal suffrage or the people's exercise of democratic choice. For the individuals or the groups 
targeted by coercion, spatial mobility has represented an answer, reactive or planned, to recover 
security, inviting in turn new responses from the state in its aim to maintain control over individuals 
and populations. 
A vast research agenda remains to be open that would allow the identification of the trajectories of 
9
the changes – emergence, amplifications or decline - in coercion practices and methods. A major 
question is the recurrence of several of these practices under different political regimes, a 
phenomenon that calls for interrogating how various security agencies have endowed coercive 
practices with different meanings and have embedded them in difference systems of legitimation. 
New ideological frames of reference, new emergencies, new historical contingencies have all 
provided new interpretive frameworks and vocabularies justifying coercion and control of mobility, 
and new types of social groups upon whom to apply this control. The content and meaning of such 
notions as treason and enmity in particular have shifted over time. This leads to questioning the 
production of discourse and symbols by state authorities, along the lines of Eric Davis’ work (2005) 
on historical memory and authoritarian rule under the Ba‘th. While expanding an examination of 
official narratives and representations to the monarchy, republican and post-Ba‘thist periods, there 
should be a particular focus on the elaboration and dissemination of discourses justifying control 
over population movements: imaginations of the nation and of the threats allegedly bearing down 
upon it, territorial borders and internal social and spatial boundaries, security and protection, enmity 
and treason, and images and sources of inspiration regarding sovereignty and its performance are all 
themes that should be traced, unpacked and studied in connection with the power practices they 
justified. 
Other items on a research agenda would be the structures put in place for the identification and 
categorisation of individuals that are a pre-requisite to control their mobility.  Here again, time 
frames should be delineated and their coinciding with ruptures in political history should be 
verified. The example of the food distribution system that has been carried over from the Ba‘thist to 
the post-Ba‘thist era is a case in point. Another one is the mention of religious or tribal affiliation on 
identity cards: in which contexts were various items and categories introduced or removed? Still 
another one is the presence or absence in censuses of questions on ethno-national affiliation, 
particularly Turkish (for the Turkmen) or Kurdish and the implications for individuals of registering 
as such14. One objective would be to identify spheres of action (legal or administrative), methods or 
techniques (such as censuses), and technologies (such as statistics or computerisation) that have 
been used by successive regimes and non-state political actors today to objectify individuals 
through practices of identification and identity categories, in particular as members of a biological 
group (the patriarchal family, the tribe) or of a community (an ethnicity, a religious group, a 
national body).  
A rich area of research concerns the actors who imagined and developed the categories of 
identification together with policies and measures of confinement, exclusion or expulsion. What are 
their backgrounds? What were their models, their inspirations at difference periods? How was the 
Indian colonial model adapted to the Iraqi theatre by the mandate administration and how was it 
contested or implemented by high-level civil servants under the monarchy? Similar questions could 
be asked about the adoption of a Stalinist model by Saddam Hussein, and an Israeli model for the 
US occupying power. What models do today’s militias use to categorise individuals and to operate 
ethnic or sectarian cleansing? What about the KRG? An as a corollary, how have individuals strived 
to evade the stigmas attached to certain identifications and resulting threats on their security? 
Identity concealment, formal religious conversion (empirical evidence suggests that both were 
adopted by a number of Iraqi Jews in order to remain in Iraq), the recourse to patronage in rural and 
urban contexts, attempts to secure alternative identity documents by bribing civil servant or 
14 It is unclear from the literature when and in which regions certain categories were used, and also 
if published census results reflected the questions asked when censuses were taken. For Kurds in the 
1987 census, see Human Rights Watch (1993) and also Michiel Leezenberg (1997) for the case of 
the Shabak, a small syncretistic religious communities in northern Iraq, who were displaced as a 
result of their registering as Kurds.
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acquiring them on the false identity market, as well as migration itself have all been strategies to 
evade the ascriptive dimension of identity categorisation and its effects.
Political migration and the reversal of violence
Especially since the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy, a considerable number of Iraqis 
have attempted to escape direct political repression or limitations on their individual freedom by 
leaving the country. This politically motivated emigration, in conjunction with successive waves of 
displacement resulting from violence and conflict, has led to the formation of exile communities of 
Iraqis in several Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Jordan, Syria, Yemen 
and, to a lesser extent, Turkey) and beyond (Great Britain and a number of other Western European 
states, countries of the former Eastern bloc, the USA, Canada, Australia etc.) (Cigerli 1998; Al-
Rasheed 1998; Vanly 2002; Fattah 2007; Shoeb et al 2007; Chatelard 2010). At times, these ‘exits’ 
from the national and political space have taken place despite measures put in place by the state 
security apparatus to control the movements of opponents beyond national boundaries. At other 
times, they have been the result of deportations carried out by state authorities. 
From a historical perspective, spatial mobility cannot be considered anomalous in the Middle East 
(Shami 1996; Chatty 2010). In the Iraqi context in particular, the Ottoman legacy calls for a re-
examination in relation to more recent trends of emigration. Modern Iraqi society inherited from the 
Ottoman era vast and complex social networks based on the free circulation of people, goods, 
money, and ideas and extending far beyond what became the frontier of the modern state. Pastoral 
herders, tribal leaders, traders, Shi‘i pilgrims, religious students or clerics, members of Sunni Sufi 
orders, Kurdish nationalist elites, members of extended families and of certain ethnic or ethno-
religious communities (Assyrians and Chaldeans, Turkmen etc.), those influenced by Turkish and 
Iranian intellectual movements, activists in modern political parties (like the Syrian Ba‘th) etc. have 
all circulated within and exchanged across ecological, social, religious, political and economic 
spaces whose boundaries have never coincided with those of states. People of all social classes and 
ethnicities have therefore been mobile and, for those who were not, their social world was shaped 
and influenced by the mobility of others who belonged to their tribal, familial, intellectual, political 
or religious group. Territoriality and identity as defined by the practices and subjectivities of these 
social groups have differed markedly from those defined by the national order that colonial and 
post-colonial states have striven to create and secure. Places of deportation or emigration outside 
Iraq can therefore at times be conceptualised as spaces of belonging and familiarity rather than 
spaces of exile and alienation, especially if they provide security and access to material, social and/
or symbolic resources. 
As for political migration, its ‘identity cycle’ in space and time and within changing political and 
ideological contexts should be considered to understand how particular identities, claimed or 
ascribed in Iraq, have been maintained or reshaped in migration and mobilized to contest regimes in 
power in Iraq and, eventually, to take power through violence. How has the context of the countries 
of emigration provided the resources to claim political power in Iraq? In which rhetoric have these 
claims been voiced: as victims, minorities, as pan-Arabists, pan-Turkists, as Assyrian or Kurdish 
nationalists, as communists, internationalists, revolutionaries, in the vocabulary of political Islam, 
in sectarian terms etc.? What types of mobilisations have been available (armed, militant, 
diplomatic, intellectual etc.)? A particularly important question to be asked is why, unlike the 
nationalist momentum of the 1970s–early 1990s within the Palestinian refugee diaspora which was 
similarly scattered between several countries and split into numerous political currents, Iraqi 
political exiles and refugees did not develop a unified discourse and practices of resistance. What 
have been therefore the historical factors and local dynamics that have maintained the 
fragmentation of the discourse, of the actions and of the identities of Iraqi exiles? 
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Together with the above, another set of questions regards the production of antagonistic group 
memories as victims and of competing visions of an Iraqi political project. What are the experiences 
and idealised frames of reference that have come to shape the collective imaginations of the exiles? 
How have those who have escaped violence through emigration integrated into their subjectivities 
and projects the experiences of those members of their groups who have suffered torture, 
assassination, displacement etc.? What role do the ideas of return and revenge play in these 
imaginations and projects? 
When the international balance of power allowed political groups from the diaspora to participate 
on the Iraqi national stage in 2003, violence was first turned against the individuals who had 
contributed to the maintenance of the Ba‘thist regime. Eventually violence was also aimed at a 
whole series of social groups, negating their right of existence in a unified political community on 
the basis of their ‘difference’. The theme of  ‘insiders’ vs. ‘outsiders’, of exile and return, initially 
restructured the political arena and that of violence. However, the process of ‘othering’ shifted 
quickly to take on sectarian overtones. The groups and factions competing for power in the new 
Iraqi political order took over the monopoly of the exercise of violence (Al-Rachid and Méténier 
2007: 115) and also appropriated another former monopoly of the Ba‘thist state: the means and 
modalities of control over population movements. In the last few years, a multiplicity of collective 
actors has directed violence against the confessional, ethnic and class composition of entire urban 
and rural areas, displacing populations inside and outside the country, and forcing others to be 
immobilised. Many members of the Ba‘thist political, military and bureaucratic elite have been 
compelled to emigrate, mostly to other Arab countries, from where some have attempted to 
mobilise resources to support the resistance undertaken by neo-Ba‘thist insurgents inside Iraq. 
Violence and vexations exerted against secular intellectuals and members of certain professional 
groups, and against women who refuse to conform to norms of public behaviour deemed Islamic 
have all been incitements to remain within restricted domestic or social spaces or, conversely, to 
leave Iraq for neighbouring countries or the West, or to take refuge in the ‘pacified’ Kurdish 
autonomous region. Iraq is today characterised by an uneven socio-spatial distribution of human 
security: human mobility is restricted due to the fragmentation of the Iraqi national space into sub-
units under different kinds of sovereignty, and to the insecurity attached to the expression or 
presumption of certain group identities in specific areas. On the one hand, the sorting out of 
populations on ethnic, communal and class grounds is outliving the rule of the militias and other 
armed groups who initiated the process. Relative social homogeneity is now maintained through 
other economic and psychological mechanisms (such as livelihoods found in new areas of 
residence, the fear of moving back to former neighbourhoods, internalization of the ethno-sectarian 
territorial divide etc.) and, arguably, due to government policies to maintain displaced populations 
in the areas where they have been displaced. On the other hand, the Iraqi government and the 
occupation forces have developed measures to contain population movements between 
neighbourhoods and regions (security barriers and walls, check-points, registration systems etc.) 
while exit from central and southern Iraq towards the Kurdish north or neighbouring countries is 
impeded in various ways both by the Iraqi authorities and by those of neighbouring political 
entities. This is despite the fact that the uneven socio-spatial distribution of security inside Iraq still 
makes mobility, for many individual and collectives, a strategy of security. 
One possible reading of the reluctance of Premier Nuri al-Maliki and most members of his 
government – the majority of whom lived in exile in Iran, Syria and elsewhere, some of them since 
the 1970s – to take any meaningful step towards engaging with those who have taken refuge abroad 
since 2003 is their belief that forced exile is a deserved punishment or, alternatively, that refugees 
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are traitors who refuse to adhere to the political project of the so-called new Iraq15. In this 
conceptualization, those newly exiled are paying the price for having caused – if only by having 
failed to be sufficiently active in their opposition to Saddam Hussein – the exile of those who are in 
power today. Similar remarks can be made regarding practices on the ground and official policies 
aimed at reversing the demographic balance that resulted from the Arabization campaign in the 
areas disputed between the KRG and the Baghdad government. For the political leadership, in 
Baghdad as well as in the KRG, “a displacement for a displacement” is therefore a just retribution 
in a vision of justice where the punishment of perpetrators must equate the wrong they have 
committed, but also where whole social groups can be made responsible for the doings of one or 
some of their members. Whatever the cultural (some would say tribal and Islamic) legitimation of 
this juridical ethos, it is a matter of particular concern that the new Iraqi authorities, far from trying 
to playing a mediating role by sponsoring processes of reconciliation between different groups and 
generations of exiled and internally displaced persons, are partisan actors justifying, if not actively 
promoting, revenge through involuntary migration. Let us note here that although the Iraqi state 
today is no longer the proximate cause of forced migration, there is a remarkable continuity in the 
conception of retributive justice and the moral economy of displacement shared by the ruling elites. 
Many of those working in humanitarian organizations wonder about the possible return of recent 
exiles said to belong in their vast majority to the educated and secular middle class. Others have 
discussed16 the effects of the most recent brain drain that entails loss of competence and human 
capital but also jeopardizes the bases on which a pluralistic civil society might be constructed in the 
new Iraq. Might the current ruling powers be convinced by these arguments and finally pursue a 
pro-active policy to regain the confidence of the exiles and promote their return? Or rather, might 
we see a repetition of the period between the 1950s and the 1980s when the economic void created 
by the involuntary emigration of Jews, Fa’ili Kurds and other Shi‘is – who also formed a large part 
of the economic, professional and intellectual elite – was rapidly filled by an emerging middle class 
trained and employed in government institutions and who became the new clients of the state? 
Several testimonies from recent exiles who have tried to regain their positions as civil servants point 
to the fact that posts have been filled by a new generation of graduates whose allegiance to one or 
the other faction in the new government is ensured, and who are overwhelmingly Shi‘is, many from 
lower middle class backgrounds.17 The vast program of 10,000 scholarships launched by Premier al-
Maliki to support the education of postgraduates in all disciplines in the best foreign universities is 
also already starting to produce a new cohort that is taking over from those who have fled the 
country. The socio-economic background, sectarian affiliation and political leaning of the majority 
of the grantees is anyone’s guess.  
 
In this context, despite the radical rupture in the Iraqi political order as of 2003, continuities with 
previous periods need to be highlighted. This item on a research agenda centred on the nexus 
between violence, human mobility and identity politics will require in depth exploration of the 
actors who have redistributed between themselves the means of control over population 
movements, their modalities of action, and the effects of the latter on individual experiences of 
violence and collective identities. In post-Ba‘thist Iraq such notions as territoriality and sovereignty 
have been profoundly altered. The state lost, and is trying to regain, the monopoly over coercive 
violence and over its technologies. It also lost the monopoly over the symbolic resources needed to 
exert and legitimise this violence. How the relations between violence and population movements 
are being reconfigured today is a crucial question. 
15Several public statements by members of the Maliki government support this analysis.
16See Joseph Sassoon’s contribution to this volume.
17Author’s interviews with Iraqis in Amman and Damascus in 2009–10.
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What therefore could be read through a systematic study of the politics of population movements is 
that, beyond the numerous and brutal ruptures in Iraqi political history, governmentality in modern 
Iraq can be analysed along the paradigms of the developmental and the authoritarian state. Both are 
models adopted concomitantly by ruling powers to exert their sovereignty over populations by 
sorting individuals out along naturalized identity categories, each the object of different treatment. 
In modern Iraq, it is the state (and would-be.states) which appears as the principal instrument of the 
fragmentation of the social and the political by categorising people not as individual citizens but as 
members of quasi-biologized collectives. The result is that Iraqis today do not see themselves as 
citizens, but as members of particular social groups which have been victimized by one or several 
other groups. Many, including those at the highest levels of the political apparatus, are locked in 
mindsets and imaginations that make them incapable of reverting patterns of social fragmentation 
and political violence of which displacement and forced migration are only some of the 
consequences. 
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